Revisiting the Chevron Doctrine: Agency Deference and Judicial Review in Seven Counties Infrastructure Coalition et al. v. Eagle County, Colorado et al. 23 U.S. 975 (2025)

On May 29th. 2025, the Supreme Court issued a decision for Seven Counties Infrastructure Coalition et al. v. Eagle County, Colorado et al. 23 U.S. 975 (2025). Seven Counties Infrastructure intended to build a railroad which would transport crude oil to refinement facilities. Railroad projects fall under the jurisdiction of the US Surface Transportation Board, so the Board prepared a draft EIS consistent with their interpretation of NEPA requirements. The report was opened for public comments, many of which declared NEPA violations with the most

Environmental groups brought the case to the DC Circuit which agreed with the suggested NEPA violations from a lack of analysis of effects of the procurement and refinement of crude oil. The Board responded by arguing analysis of these effects is not necessary because the railroad’s location and duration of the project render the procurement and refinement locations outside of the relevant time and place analysis regulations in NEPA.

The DC Circuit decision was unanimously struck down by the Supreme Court on the basis that the Board, as the agency with the authority to interpret the NEPA statute for this project, should be given deference to decide if analysis of certain impacts is required by NEPA. This decision appeared to reflect the decision issued in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) as a case decided using the Chevron doctrine.

The Chevron Doctrine 

The Chevron doctrine, established by the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) decision, has been used to determine whether an agency action challenged in court should be permitted, or whether it should be blocked by court action. The Chevron doctrine asks two basic questions:

1. Given the language in the statute in question, was the intent of Congress clear? If this point is argued and found to be within the statute, the court defers to Congressional intent to allow or deny an agency action.
2. Is the agency’s interpretation of the statute based on a “permissible construction of the statute?’ If the court finds the agency’s interpretation to be reasonable, the court defers to the agency’s ability to make sound determinations and will allow the action to stand.

According to the Chevron doctrine, an agency is given deference if the statutory language is sufficiently clear and no argument can be made that the agency interpretation is, to use the language of the case, “capricious and arbitrary.” The Chevron doctrine stood as basic precedent in agency action cases for decades before it was challenged in Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. 22 U.S. 451 (2024).

Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. 22 U.S. 451 (2024)

The Supreme Court concluded in Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce et al. 22 U.S. 451 (2024) that the Administrative Procedure Act, which authorizes many agency actions, does not include any provisions for agency deference when it would usually be given as a result of agency interpretation of a statute. In essence, all challenges to agency actions now face further scrutiny, as agency interpretation would be considered facts rather than law. Laws can only be determined by Congress or in absence of Congressional interpretation, the court, rendering agency interpretation an illegitimate basis for action not granted explicitly by law. The unanimous decision was surprising to many in the wake of Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. 22 U.S. 451 (2024), as the Seven Counties decision appears to use the Chevron doctrine despite Loper Bright explicitly rescinding it.  

The Loper Bright decision complicated the validity of the Chevron doctrine in cases such as Seven Counties.Considering this new precedent, one would assume agency interpretation of a statute would be considered additional context to the Seven Counties case, but not defense of the action as the interpretation alone is not law. However, the Seven Counties decision uses agency deference as its basis, stating the Board’s interpretation of NEPA is reasonable and rendering all actions taken as a result of that interpretation legitimate.

Impacts on Hydropower Reform

There is potential for significant direct impacts in the hydropower space with this new precedent for NEPA interpretation. It could become difficult to argue insufficiencies in NEPA analysis as the reporting agency could respond by saying the report is consistent with their NEPA interpretation, and court precedent would agree this is a valid response.

The concept of direct and indirect effects in NEPA has been challenged since its inception, and Seven Counties agrees with the Board’s definition of “relevant time and place” as being immediate and visible. The impacts of hydropower are often not obvious in a manner  consistent with the Board’s interpretation of NEPA, as the impacts are felt on a broad scale with lasting impacts over time. It would be possible for agencies such as FERC to adopt similar interpretations, making it difficult to argue the indirect effects of hydropower must be considered in NEPA review. In this case, it might be more efficient to consider strategies outside of NEPA violations, such as through Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.